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ABSTRACT
This paper uses a Delphi panel of 26 air transport experts to forecast the structure of air
transport in the EU in 2015 in respect of network carriers, low cost airlines and passenger
behaviour. Secondary research was used to construct a number of scenarios about the
future structure and strategy of EU network and low cost airlines and also traveller
behaviour. Consensus of opinions was sought amongst the panel in a two-round process.
The consensus opinion of the Delphi experts was that; network carrier consolidation will
reduce EU players to less than five, there will be only 2 – 3 large LCCs, Business Class
products will disappear on short hauls, and leisure travellers will take an increasing number
of multiple short-duration holidays.
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Introduction
The purpose of this study, funded by the European Commission was to identify future
trends in the European air transport sector over the next 10-15 years. While the full
European Commission study covered many aspects of “Aviation in the EU” (European
Commission, 2005), this paper focuses on EU network and low cost carriers and also
changes in consumer demand for air transport. The paper uses published literature to
examine and establish the current position with respect of network and low cost carriers and
consumer demand. This analysis is then used to develop possible future market scenarios.
The likelihood of these scenarios coming into reality was then examined using a two stage
Delphi survey of aviation experts.
EU Air Transport in the first five years of the 21st Century
The major part of the European airline industry was in difficulty before the traumatic events
of September 11th 2001. A number of factors had started to impact adversely on the
industry’s financial fortunes from 2000 onwards. A slowing down in key economies, such
as those of Germany and Japan, as well as several more in Europe led to a slowing in traffic
growth. The collapse of the dot.com boom undermined business confidence which in turn
impacted the demand for business travel. At the same time in many long-haul markets
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overcapacity was becoming a serious problem. This overcapacity and the very rapid
growth of low-cost operators, especially in intra-European markets, were creating strong
downward pressure on average fares and yields. Yet costs were rising. Between October
1998 and October 2000 fuel prices doubled, while labour costs were rising as new wage
agreements were negotiated in the aftermath of the very profitable years of 1995 to 1999.
The events of September 2001 turned a growing crisis into disaster as traffic levels in many
key markets collapsed, more especially on the North Atlantic. Sabena and Swissair filed
for bankruptcy. Most of Europe’s scheduled airlines posted large losses or severely
diminished profits for 2001. Only the large low-cost carriers, Ryanair and easyJet, bucked
the trend by showing increased profits.
The invasion of Iraq early in 2003, followed by the SARS epidemic in the Far East, hit
Middle East and Asian routes. But as traffic growth started to accelerate again in 2004, a
new challenge, the rapid rise in fuel prices began to undermine airline profitability once
more. Against this turbulent and unstable market environment since 2000 the financial
performance of Europe’s airlines was varied.
Network airlines
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The position of the top ten EU airlines, in relation to their share of total Available Seat
Kilometres (ASK) and departures within the EU in 2004, is illustrated in Table 1. Clearly,
British Airways, Lufthansa and Air France are the principal carriers in the EU market.
These three carriers are responsible for over half the total ASK and over 40% of weekly
flights operated by the EU network airlines. If KLM’s operation is added to that its owner,
Air France, 61% of ASK and 47% of departures are performed by the top three carriers.
The rest of EU airlines offer much smaller shares of total capacity.
{TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE}
Figure 1 illustrates the financial performance of EU airlines. It is of interest to note that EU
airlines have always struggled to make any profits on intra-European routes, however their
operations on these routes have been vital to feed traffic onto their more profitable long
haul routes. The profitability of European operations is a major issue for all EU network
carriers, especially in recent years when they have faced very tough competition from the
low costs carriers. The profitability of long haul routes has encouraged carriers to focus on
these types of routes in order to improve profitability.
{FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE}
Figure 2 illustrates the EU airlines intra-European RPK as a percentage of their total
operations. While carriers such as KLM, British Airways and Air France are less dependent
on intra-European traffic, others such as Luxair and Air Malta have been mainly operating
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on intra-European routes. Clearly, this latter group of carriers are more exposed to the
threat of low cost airline competition than others.
{FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE}
Analysis of EU operations by airline shows that while the largest carriers (measured by
ASK) have increased capacity at a lower rate, and in some cases they have made cut-backs,
the smaller operators have increased their capacity at a higher rate. For example, over the
five year period, 1999-2004, British Airways, Lufthansa and Air France have increased
their ASK by an average annual rate of 1%, 6% and 4% respectively while the number of
departures have changed by -2%, 2% and 4% (OAG, 1999 and OAG, 2004). Over the
same period, Austrian and Spanair increased their ASK at an average rate of 14% and 9%
each year and departures at a rate of 20% and 17%. It is noticeable that the large East
European airlines, LOT, Malev and Czech have been adding flights at an average rate of
10% to 13% per year.
Low cost carriers
The low cost airline sector in Europe has grown dramatically since Ryanair first started
operating as a low cost carrier (LCC) in 1991, and easyJet established in 1995. The 9/11
terrorist attacks acted as a catalyst for a dramatic change in the structure of the UK airline
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industry. While British Airways maintained short haul business fares and reduced capacity
for leisure travellers, easyJet and Ryanair reduced their fares and built capacity. EasyJet in
particular took BA’s capacity reduction at Gatwick as an invitation to establish a base at
London’s second airport.
In 2002 and 2004, as the UK market began to become crowded following the arrival of
Buzz, bmibaby, MyTravelLite and Jet2, among others, consolidation occurred as easyJet
bought out BA’s subsidiary Go and Ryanair purchased KLM’s subsidiary Buzz.
Continental Europe is following suit with a rapid burst of high market growth, which is
expected to be followed by a levelling off and consolidation. Indeed, according to Credit
Suisse First Boston, LCCs in 2004 accounted for 20% of European airline passengers, and
43% of the domestic UK market (Travel Weekly, 2004).
LCC passenger traffic is estimated to have totalled 94.6 million in 2004. Table 2 shows the
10 largest European LCCs in terms of available seat-kms in June 2004. EasyJet and
Ryanair are, by some degree, the largest LCCs in Europe but Air Berlin is not far behind in
size. Air Berlin still operates a considerable number of charter/leisure flights, which are
included in the table.
{TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE}
Figure 3 shows the percentage of scheduled seats on domestic and intra-EU routes provided
by LCCs for each of the original 15 Member States.
{FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE}
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The addition of ten countries to the European Union has meant that there has been a lot of
activity in the accession countries as LCCs look to establish a presence, while a number of
home country start-ups have looked to gain entry into the market (including Wizz Air in
Poland and SkyEurope in Slovakia and Hungary). By the summer of 2004 the LCC sector
had grown in number to around 50 airlines, according to the European Low Fares Airline
Association (Airline Business, 2004). However, aside from easyJet and Ryanair most LCCs
were either loss making or generating only very marginal levels of profit. LCCs not
operating profitably in 2004 included Hapag Lloyd Express, Norwegian, Sterling,
Thomsonfly and Virgin Express. Germanwings claimed to have reached break-even in
2004, while Air Berlin earned a profit of less than 10 million euros on a turnover of 1.05
billion euros.
Key changes in passenger behaviour
Economic growth, business confidence, people’s desire to travel and price are the key
drivers of demand for air travel. The increase in globalisation and freedom of movement of
people and goods within and between regions, are positive factors affecting demand.
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It appears that leisure travel is growing faster than business travel. For example, Table 3
shows leisure travel into and out of six principal UK airports to a number of European
countries growing more quickly than business travel. In 1996 the leisure market
represented 55.8% of the passengers, however over the seven year period leisure travel
grew more quickly (at 9.4% pa) than business travel (just 2.5% pa) and by 2003 the leisure
market represented 66.6% of the market.
{TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE}
These changes in market structure are mainly attributable to the growth of the low cost
carrier sector which has led to a fall in yield. Changes in both the business travel and
leisure markets will be considered below.
The business travel market
The business travel market has seen a marked change in recent years but remains vital to
the airline industry. The airline industry has long relied on the business travel market as a
major source of profit. Although only 15% of the IATA airlines’ capacity is allocated to
Business Class, it generates 28% of revenue. More importantly, the operating profit margin
from Business Class in 2002 was 29% compared to just 5% from Economy Class (IATA,
2003).
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From 2000 onwards, however, the proportion of travellers using Business Class has been
falling. A decline in the take up of business class tickets and increased downgrading
behaviour has shown that the business market does display price elasticity. This has been
particularly evident in the short haul market with the arrival of low cost airlines. Figure 4
illustrates the decline in business passengers travelling in business class on a number of
European airlines. British Airways forecasts that as few as 15% of short haul business trips
will be taken in business class by 2006 (Sentance, 2003).
{FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE}
The industry is coming to terms with the fact that a large proportion of passengers have
chosen price over service (e.g. frills, choice or flexibility). As short haul business travel in
Business Class has fallen, a survey by Company Barclaycard shows that the proportion of
business passengers that have used low cost carriers for business trips has risen to 71% in
2004/5 compared to just 28% in 1998/9 (see Table 4, Company Barclaycard, 2004/5). This
is due not only lower fares but the fact that business passengers have more choice of
business destinations by low cost airlines.
{TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE}
IATA’s Corporate Air Travel Survey (IATA 2004) shows (Figure 5) that price has become
the principal determinant for short haul business travellers with FFP points and convenient
schedule being next most important.
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{FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE}
For long haul travel, seat comfort, price and FFP seem to be the principal purchase factors,
although price would seem to be relatively less important than for short haul travel.
Satellite and electronic communication technology can be seen as having both a generation
and substitution impact on the demand for business travel. The ability provided by
technology to communicate effectively with business partners and customers anywhere in
the world can be seen as leading to a growth in business travel as executives travel
increasingly far afield to conduct business. In this way communication technology can be
seen as a travel generator. However the ability to conduct business effectively with IP
based technologies like web-casting and file sharing office suites, and video- and tele-
conferencing may suppress the need to travel for business. Face-to-face sales meetings are
unlikely to be easily substituted by electronic communication, whereas internal project
meetings are more likely to be able to be conducted online.
The leisure travel market
Europeans tend to enjoy long paid annual leave (see Table 5) Although there is some
variation in leave entitlements among states, with those in Western Europe tending to enjoy
more generous holiday provision than their neighbours in the East, a large proportion of the
population in all of them take advantage of their holiday entitlement. This should certainly
have a positive impact on air travel within and from Europe.
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{TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE}
In recent years there has been a trend towards a greater number of shorter trips by European
travellers. Traditionally, a single long holiday each year was the norm. However, there
seems to be a growing trend to split the annual holidays and take shorter breaks. Table 6
illustrates the annual growth rate in the number of short and long holidays. It can be seen
that short breaks are increasingly popular in the majority of the European countries in the
sample.
{TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE}
In recent years there has been a greater growth in travel within Europe than to countries
outside Europe. For example, in 2003, traffic from UK to Europe increased by 8.9%
compared to 2.5% on long haul trips. This compares with an annul growth rate of 7.3% to
Europe and 6.9% on long haul between 1993 and 2000. The slow growth in traffic on long
haul routes could be due to concerns about health (e.g. SARS, DVT), terrorism and security
in recent years.
The internet has had a profound impact on the way consumers search for and book their
holidays. The fact that the majority of bookings with low cost airlines are made through the
internet has led to the growth in popularity of this channel, and in turn has made
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comparison of airline prices much easier. This is one of the contributory factors to the
decline in airline average prices. The trend in leisure passengers indicates that they expect
and will continue to expect low fares. Low fares have been the main stimulus for growth in
leisure travel, with leisure passengers being prepared to switch destination for good deals.
Research scenarios
Following this brief review the following scenarios were constructed to be assessed in a
Delphi survey of air transport industry experts:-
 The largest network carriers will come to dominate the European airline industry by a
combination of natural growth, alliances, and merger and acquisition activity
 Smaller network carriers will need to find defensible niche roles or are likely to reduce
in importance or be subsumed within the networks of the dominant European carriers
 Network carriers will address the fundamentally poor economics of short haul feeder
services into hubs by increasingly using franchised feeder services and partners
 In long haul markets, business travellers will increasingly put higher value on business
class services
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 In short haul markets business class products will disappear as an insufficient number
of business travellers are prepared to pay for them.
 As technology continues to improve, business travellers will increasingly embrace web
and video based conferencing solutions to substitute for some business trips
 Growth in long haul leisure travel destinations will grow faster than short haul
destinations
 Leisure trips will get of increasingly shorter duration.
Methodology
To forecast the EU air transport market of 2015 a Delphi study was conducted with experts
within the EU air transport field.
The Delphi study technique is a communication structure aimed at producing detailed
critical examination and discussion of issues. Developed in the 1950s and 60s by the Rand
Corporation, the technique was designed to elicit the opinions of experts in a particular
field in a systematic way (Sackman, 1974). It has been described as a “succession of
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iterative brainstorming rounds” (Jantsch, 1967), and is well suited to forecasting complex
problems and is an excellent tool for gaining input from recognised sources of expertise.
Linstone and Turoff (1975) note that at the outset the technique was used mainly for
technological forecasting, however it has been applied across a number of fields of research
including economics, operational research, philosophy, psychology, sociology and
statistics. Examples of research problems that the Delphi technique has been applied to
include; marketing expenditure effectiveness (Kotler, 1970), the demand for telephony
(Day, 1973), forecasting economic conditions (Decker, 1974), and political science (Pavitt,
1972).
The Delphi method involves the recruitment of a number of field “experts” and uses an
iterative process to attempt to reach consensual forecasts. The experts and their
contributions are anonymous so that each expert’s view is given considered equally. The
process involves collecting answers to a number of questions posed to each of the experts.
In the first round each expert is expected to provide an answer to each question and also a
justification for their answer along with any assumptions made. The research team then
distil the answers and feedback a summary of the responses and justifications with the
entire group. In the second round, the experts then consider the strength of the various
answers and re-assess their own answers. In this way over a number of iterations it is likely
that the views of the experts will coalesce and a degree of consensus will be achieved.
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The Delphi approach enables the communication between panel members of diverse and
potential divergent opinions. The technique reaps the benefits of group decision making
while insulating the process from the limitations of group decision-making and undesirable
interaction effects; e.g., over-dominant group members, lobbying, or "bandwagonism"
(Cline, 2000). While there are some clear advantages with the approach, conducting a
Delphi study can be very time consuming. The requirement of the experts to spend time to
describe their views and to provide supporting arguments, the requirement of the research
team to distil the submissions of the experts at the end of each round, and the iterative
nature of the approach means that the whole process can take many months. Computer
based elicitation of answers, particularly where experts are dispersed geographically, can
reduce the time taken to collect answers. However, persuading experts in their field to
spend time completing repeated rounds of surveys can be difficult. Linstone and Turoff
(1975) summarise eight pitfalls that can befall a Delphi study including the tendency for
forecasters to use a sub-conscious discounting rate in their calculations, to simplify the
complex and to rely on panel experts that do not have a wide view of system being
considered. They also note the potential to come to erroneous conclusions due to the
process of making respondents anonymous. Where a particularly insightful expert has a
opinion that opposes the majority of the panel this, perhaps accurate forecast, may be lost
as other panellists coalesce around the alternative view (Linstone and Turoff, 1975).
For this study a number of key air transport industry experts were invited to participate in
the Delphi panel. Sixty-one industry experts working in senior roles for airlines (network,
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LCC, regional, cargo, and leisure), airports, civil aviation authorities, industry associations,
consultancies were contacted by email with an invitation to participate in the panel.
A questionnaire for the first round of the survey was developed. Statements on which the
panel were to comment were developed by the research team which included eight faculty
members of the Department of Air Transport at Cranfield University (The authors would
like to recognise the participation of P. Morrell, R. Pagliari, I. Stockman, A. Foster, G.
Williams, and R. Fewings) and Visiting Professor Rigas Doganis. The developed survey
was then sent to industry experts, Andrew Hofton and Chris Tarry to ensure the content
validity of the questionnaire, and that the instructions for the participants were
unambiguous. Panellists were informed that they would be required to complete two self
completion surveys, the first of which was included with the email. Participants had the
option of completing the survey online, or by printing the survey and returning their hand
written responses.
The first round questionnaire contained 27 statements which respondents asked whether
they agreed or disagreed with (respondents could also indicate that they had “no opinion”
about a particular statement). Respondents were also asked to provide comments on the
reasons for the answer given, and to indicate the strength with which respondents held their
views. In this way the veracity of the statements in the survey could be examined and
thereby test various hypotheses about the future of air transport in the EU.
The Delphi technique seeks to establish where the panel is in broad agreement on a
particular issue. For the purpose of this study, it was decided that if three quarters or more
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of the respondents were in agreement on a particular topic consensus was broadly reached.
Where consensus on a topic was not found then the comments provided by the panel was
used to understanding the reasons for the division in opinion. In these cases new questions
that drew on the comments given in the first round were written and used in a second round
survey of the panel members. Again 75% agreement in the second round survey was used
as a “broad consensus” threshold
The approach to ask respondents to rate the strength of their views has been used in a
number of Delphi Studies (e.g. Ludlow, 1975, Hamoen, 1998, Hummel, 2002). In this
study respondents were asked to rate the strength of their view on a five point Likert style
scale with a score of 5 being “Very strongly held view” to 1 equal to a “Very weakly held
view”. To assess the strength with which the majority held their view, the average score
was calculated and presented in the findings. The higher the score for strength of view the
greater the confidence the researchers had in the veracity of the majority expert view.
Results
Twenty-six of the group of experts invited to join the Delphi panel responded to the first
survey stage. This represents a response rate of 43%. In some studies where the panel is
highly concerned with the subject area a very high response rate has been achieved. For
example in a small study of proactive contracting in US Air Force a response rate of 87% in
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a panel of 15 was achieved (Wellman, 2003) where as in studies where the experts are
drawn from a larger group and the interest in the findings of the report are less directly
related to the experts the response rate is unsurprisingly lower. For example in a study of
drug-abuse policy (Jillson, 1975), forty-five experts were invited to participate and twenty-
five completed the two rounds (55%). In this case the importance of the study to the experts
would be limited as the results would have little commercial value to the participants
thereby reducing the likely response rate. Delbecq et al (1975) suggest that the panel size of
a homogeneous group of ten to fifteen participants is adequate. Given that all respondents
were working in the air transport industry it was felt the sample was sufficient.
The panel reached consensus on 11 of the 27 statements in this first round. Where
consensus was not reached, the written opinions and the strength of the confidence in the
replies given, were used to develop new statements more likely to attain a consensual view.
A statement in the first survey was somewhat ambiguous, and this was split into two
separate statements for the second round. Consequently a second stage survey with 14 new
statements was sent to the panel of 25 respondents for completion. In the second stage
consensus was once again defined 75% agreement.
Network carriers
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Table 7 shows the results of the first stage of the Delphi study concerning network carriers.
These are the statements for which consensus were reached. The results show broad
consensus to the view that the difficulty network carriers face in short haul markets will
mean that these carriers will increasingly focus on longer haul markets, and use franchise or
small alliance partners to feed their long haul networks.
{TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE}
Another scenario proposed to the Delphi panel suggested that as network carriers will never
be able to achieve the cost structures of the low cost carriers in their short haul markets,
network carriers will increasingly focus on long haul markets where they can derive
sustainable profit streams. The network carriers will pull out of a significant proportion of
their short haul markets, remaining in only very large short haul markets or on routes where
there is large proportion of business travellers. The network carriers will increase their use
of smaller airlines to feed their long haul routes. The feeder airlines may be niche/regional
airlines that have cost structures that are suited to this role. A large proportion of Delphi
expert agreed that large network carriers will increasingly migrate to long haul routes, and
they will make greater use of franchisee or smaller alliance partners in feeding traffic to
their long haul services.
Although focusing on long haul routes could increase the opportunity to serve more high
yielding passengers, it can lead to over capacity and lower yields as more network carriers,
especially those from the US, turn their attention to long haul routes. Similarly, the
Mason & Alamdari 20
expansion of the Gulf area airlines could be a threat to EU airlines, especially on long haul
routes to the Gulf and beyond. As discussed before airlines from Middle East sub-region
have ordered the largest number of wide body aircraft to be delivered over the next 10
years, including the 51 Airbus A380s ordered by Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways
combined. A large majority of respondent experts agreed that such scenarios will be the
nature of competition in the future. Given that some of the Gulf area airlines are very well
positioned in their markets, they could compete fiercely with the EU airlines. At the same
time, it would not be surprising to witness even more intense competition on North Atlantic
routes leading to further overcapacity and lower yields.
In the second stage consensus was reached in five of the nine new statements. As network
carriers face up to the poor economics of bringing short haul feed traffic into hubs with
small originating markets, there will be fewer main hubs in the EU. A very large proportion
of experts believe that hub and spoke operations are here to stay as an important component
of inter-continental travel. However, these hubs will lose their degree of importance as
more flights will by-pass hubs in response to increasing demand for non stop services.
Recent trends in large airline partnerships and alliances and the economics of the industry
helped formulate a scenario where the network carrier market in the EU will consolidate
considerably in the next ten years through merger and acquisition (and airline failures)
resulting in between three and five dominant network carriers. Replies to the Delphi survey
indicate that the group of experts strongly agreed that in the next 10 to 15 years no more
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than five large EU based airlines will be around. It was noted that such a trend has already
started with the merger of Air France and KLM, the potential take over of Swiss by
Lufthansa and the close collaboration between British Airways and Iberia.
{TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE}
On the subject of network carriers establishing low-cost subsidiaries, the general belief
expressed by the panel is that although this has been employed as a strategy to combat low
cost airlines, it is unlikely to succeed. It could be used as a short term tactic until the
“parent” airline can lower its cost base.
As the airline network market becomes increasingly dominated by a few large players,
smaller network carriers will face acquisition or failure leading to only two or three
medium sized airlines surviving. The experts rejected this idea believing that these airlines
will carry on by focusing on niche markets. They also rejected the idea that these airlines
will focus on feeding traffic to large network carriers. However, they agreed that medium
size airlines will increasingly adopt low cost business models as this is the only way to
ensure survival.
The experts could not agree on the number of cabins required in long haul fleets. A number
of respondents believed that the three-class service is here to stay but it will be business,
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premium economy and economy rather than first, business and economy. On the issue of
EU airlines offering unbundled products, with each element sold separately, there was a
complete division among the respondents.
High speed rail services will be viable alternatives to short-haul point-to-point air links.
But where these services connect with the air transport network through integrated airport
rail-stations, there is an opportunity for cooperation, particularly through the provision of
rail-based feeder services. The two developments, competition and cooperation, are not
mutually exclusive and this was reflected in replies from the Delphi panel. Members were
pretty evenly split on the question of competion or complementarity. Some pointed out the
value of cooperation in freeing capacity at airports, but others cited the success of high-
speed rail in competing on short-haul intercity routes. A number identified as crucial the
provision of fully integrated airport/railway interchange stations if rail is to be a feeder of
air transport network.
Another area where the experts did not reach a consensus was that of trade union
collaboration with airline management. Half the respondents hoped that this would be the
case, but the rest disagreed on the basis that the pressure on airlines to make profit would
negatively affects job numbers and wages, leading to potential conflict between
management and employees.
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Low cost
The Delphi panel were of the opinion that the while the low cost sector is likely to capture a
very significant share of the intra-EU market not all low cost carriers will prosper.
{TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE}
The two statements that the panel agreed with in the first round of the survey was that more
than half of intra-EU traffic would be carried by low cost carriers by 2015 and that there
will only be two or three large LCCs.
The forecast of the size of the market is broadly in line with other studies that have forecast
the future size of the low cost carrier market, and how far the segment will penetrate the
network carrier market. For example, the European Low Fares Airlines Association
(ELFAA) forecasts that low cost traffic in Europe will be 40% of the market by 201010,
while TUI estimates the low cost sector to be 33% of the market in 201011. However, the
Delphi panel is of the view that the LCC share of the intra-EU market will be even larger
than these other forecasts. When asked about EU policies to limit regional or airport
subsidies, the view of the panel (in the second stage) was that the removal of any such aid
would have only a minor impact on the growth of the market.
10 Liberalisation of European Air Transport: The benefits of low fares airlines to consumers, airports, regions
and the environment, ELFAA, 2004
11 Wolfgang John, Trends in leisure travel: What holds for the future? 8Th Hamburg Aviation Conference, Feb
2005
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The low cost segment has already seen a large proportion of failures and take-overs in the
last couple of years. It is likely as the segment grows towards maturity throughout its
European markets that there will be further consolidation. The Delphi panel thought that
the sector will be dominated by a small number of large players. There seem to be
significant economies of scale in the low cost sector. These include the potential for large
discounts for significant aircraft purchase deals, maintenance and ground handling. There
also seems to be first mover advantage in the market. We have seen the successful
establishment of new bases of some very large low cost carriers in markets outside their
home countries, while new start-ups are finding it increasingly difficult to enter markets
where other low cost carriers have already established. This view is also supported by
evidence from the US market where three carriers dominate the sector. As to the numbers
of other LCCs in the market, the panel did not reach a consensus. More than 60% of the
panel, however, did think that more than 10 smaller/niche carriers would exist in the market
throughout the research period, although volatility in the market would mean the individual
players are likely to change.
{TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE}
The Delphi panel, in the second stage, did not seem to think that as low cost carriers
increase their network coverage they would enter into codesharing or interlining
arrangements with network carriers. The reasons given were: the lack of slots at hub
airports; the necessity of LCCs to breakaway from their normal model to enable such
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formal arrangements; and the fact that many LCCs prefer to fly to secondary airports. This
would imply that in the future air transport market will have two quite separate systems:
point to point short haul services mainly provided by LCCs; and interconnecting networks
provided by traditional carriers.
The panel was split on whether LCCs would introduce facilitated online connections. This
is a facility offered already by Southwest in the US and with a significant number of
passengers “self-connecting” at the main bases for LCCs (e.g. Stansted) the networks of the
large LCCs are becoming sufficiently large to warrant such a development in the EU
market.
Market behaviour
The fall in value placed on short haul business class travel and large numbers of travellers
downgrading to economy class tickets or using low cost carriers suggested that business
class service in short haul markets are likely to be withdrawn. The Delphi panel were in
broad agreement with this scenario, and therefore we conclude that by 2015 business class
products will no longer available for intra-EU travel.
As video conferencing technology and other forms of web-based communication tools get
increasingly sophisticated, it was felt that air travel, particularly for business related
purposes may in someway be impacted. However, the panel were clear in their view that
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video-conferencing would not limit the growth of air travel within the time frame of the
study. The written comments indicated that while this technology may reduce the demand
for some trips, the availability of such communication devices would lead to traffic
generation which would either outstrip the substitution effect or be at least neutral.
The desk research highlighted the growth in shorter-duration holidays. The panel were in
near total consensus when considering this issue. The results show that the panel believes
the trend towards a greater number of, shorter-duration holidays will continue throughout
the study period.
{TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE}
The desk research noted the establishment of business class only services on some long
haul routes. In the first stage of the survey the panel were asked whether such services
would become “commonplace”. The comments indicated that this was unlikely and that
such services were more likely to develop in some niche markets. The revised statement
used in the second stage of the Delphi study asked whether such services were likely to
succeed but only in a “limited number of inter-continental routes”. The panel strongly
agreed with the revised statement indicating that the future market is likely to see such
services continue and perhaps grow, but they will only operate in a fairly small number of
markets. One respondent thought these are likely to be ‘the trunk routes only, where the
volumes will allow for the level of schedule to make the product a realistic & consistent
business choice for passengers’.
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Regarding the growth of long haul holiday markets, the panel once again did not reach
consensus. Most panellists thought that the market would grow more quickly than the
short haul holiday market (but from a significantly lower base), but prices, exchange rates,
and the availability of low cost flights to short haul destinations were all noted as issues
that impact long haul’s comparatively higher growth rate over short haul holidays.
{TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE}
Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to assess the elements affecting the market structure and
financial viability of European air transport over the next 10-15 years. A Delphi study
approach was a suitable method drawing together the views of industry experts to assess
veracity of hypotheses about how network carriers, low cost carriers and airline customers
in the forecast time frame. The results of the Delphi experts suggest that business
travellers will increasingly seek better value for money leading to the end of business class
services in short haul markets and leisure travellers taking advantage of low fares to
vacation more frequently both in the EU and further abroad. The airline market is likely to
consolidate into a small number of very large network carriers and a similarly small number
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of very large low cost carriers. The surviving low cost carriers will prosper and eventually
carry about half of intra-EU traffic. Feeder services into main hub airports will
increasingly be operated by lower cost based franchised partner airlines. There will
continue to be an independent role for the small and medium sized European carries, by
focusing on point-to-point markets, and feeding traffic to larger network airlines. High-
speed rail could also provide feed into hubs where the infrastructure allows that, but
elsewhere is likely to compete with short haul air services. Competition for network
carriers will continue to be intense on major long haul markets. Services to Gulf and
beyond will become increasingly vulnerable to competition from Gulf area airlines due to
their large expansion in capacity.
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Table 1: Largest EU Network airlines, by share of Network airline ASK
Airline % total ASK (2004) Accumulated %
British Airways 20.4 20.4
Lufthansa 17.8 38.2








Source: OAG June 2004
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Figure 1: European network carriers net profit by regions, 1999 to 2003













Source: Association of European Airlines, 2004
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Figure 2: EU airlines intra-European RPK as % of total operations (2004)




























intra European RPK (%)
Source: IATA, 2005
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Table 2: Largest European Low cost carriers, by share of Low cost airline ASK
% of total ASK Cumulative %of total EU low cost airlines
Ryanair 26 26
easyJet 24 50
Air Berlin 14 64
Volare Airlines 6 69
bmibaby 4 74
Germanwings 4 77
Hagag-Lloyd Express 3 81
Virgin Express 3 84
flybe 3 87
Norwegian Air Shuttle 3 89
Source: OAG June 2004
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Figure 3: Percentage of seats provided by LCCs on domestic and intra-EU routes
Source: compiled from OAG data (2005)
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Table 3: Scheduled passengers ex-UK airports by purpose of travel







Destination Business Leisure Business Leisure Business Leisure 1996 2003
Austria 315,357 782,086 307,545 513,818 0.36 6.19 62.6% 71.3%
Belgium 856,444 728,307 992,136 577,808 -2.08 3.36 36.8% 46.0%
Denmark 720,890 1,077,308 631,075 718,399 1.92 5.96 53.2% 59.9%
Finland 254,223 250,375 216,752 226,525 2.30 1.44 51.1% 49.6%
France 2,328,962 5,029,358 2,098,315 2,822,137 1.50 8.60 57.4% 68.3%
Germany 3,323,932 4,916,891 2,933,951 3,380,707 1.80 5.50 53.5% 59.7%
Luxembourg 82,690 72,928 106,668 54,178 -3.57 4.34 33.7% 46.9%
Netherlands 1,967,767 2,446,149 1,656,336 1,756,224 2.49 4.85 51.5% 55.4%
Portugal 384,056 1,397,200 314,238 677,386 2.91 10.90 68.3% 78.4%
Spain 1,581,031 7,522,923 873,923 2,182,573 8.84 19.34 71.4% 82.6%
Sweden 642,887 1,242,262 625,562 605,603 0.39 10.81 49.2% 65.9%
Switzerland 1,309,332 2,076,950 1,078,062 1,409,122 2.82 5.70 56.7% 61.3%
Total 14,162,671 28,243,490 11,929,660 15,076,150 2.48 9.38 55.8% 66.6%
Source data aggregated from CAA surveys
(Incl. LCY, LGW, LHR, LTN, MAN, STN)
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Figure 4: Decline of intra European business class passengers (2001 - 2003)
Source: Association of European Airlines, 2004
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Table 4: Business travel behaviour and attitudes
Traveller behaviour and
attitudes
1998/99 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005
Use low cost airlines for
business travel? 28% 39% 53% 62% - 69% 71%
Travellers used e-tickets 19% 31% 46% 57% 64% 67% -
Percentage of annual
business travel in Business
Class 33% 28% 32% 41% 38% 27% 29%
In general do you think
Business Class provides
value for money?
Yes 24% 25% 24% 37% - 15% -
Source: Company Barclaycard, Business Travel Survey (1999 – 2005)
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Figure 5: Factors influencing carrier choice (2004)






















SH -CATS 2004 LH - CATS 2004
Source: Corporate Air Travel Survey, IATA, 2004
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% of population taking a
holiday
Germany 25 45 75%
France 25 47 74%
UK 20 40 73%
Spain 20 44 50%
Italy 27 39 90%
Czech Republic 15 34 83%
Poland 15 34 56%
Source: Euromonitor, various country reports
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Table 6: Leisure trips by length of stay - average annual percentage growth (1999 - 2003)
1-3 days 4-7 days More than 7 days
Germany -0.6 -1.4 1.5
France 2.4 29.3 -15.2
UK -0.3 0.3 0.2
Spain 1.7 1.6 0.3
Italy 4.4 2.3 1.3
Source: Euromonitor, various country reports
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Table 7: First Stage Delphi Results: Network carriers






Network carriers will increasingly focus on long haul operations 19 5 2 79.17% 3.79
Larger European Network carriers will increasingly use franchisee or
smaller alliance partners to feed their long-haul services instead of
operating their own flights 20 4 2 83.3% 3.65
US carriers’ intention to grow long haul operations will result in over-
capacity and lower yields in North Atlantic markets 20 3 2 87.0% 3.70
The enormous expansion of capacity by Gulf area airlines in the near
future will undermine the viability of EU airlines’ services to the Gulf and
beyond. 20 4 2 83.3% 3.90
All but 2-3 medium sized and smaller EU airlines will fail or be acquired
by larger carriers. 5 19 1 79.2% 3.68
Medium and smaller sized EU airlines will focus on feeding traffic to
dominant network carriers. 6 18 2 75.0% 3.76
Strength of views measured from 1 (very weak) to 5 (very strong)
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Table 8: Second Stage Delphi Results: Network Carriers






Hub and spoke networks will continue to be the principal component of
inter-continental travel. 18 4 1 81.8% 3.28
Network carrier consolidation will result in no more than 5 large EU based
carriers. 19 3 1 86.4% 4.21
On long haul routes, the majority of airlines will offer only 2 classes of
travel. 14 8 1 63.6% 3.57
Network carrier products for flights within the EU will become unbundled,
with each element purchasable individually. 8 9 6 52.9% 3.11
Low cost subsidiaries of network carriers are unlikely to succeed. 17 3 3 85.00% 3.88
Airlines will respond to the demand for more direct services by scheduling
more flights that by-pass hubs. 20 3 0 87.0% 3.60
High speed rail will become complimentary to, rather than competitive
with, the services of network carriers. 11 10 2 52.4% 3.73
Trade unions will increasingly work with airlines to preserve jobs in the
face of intense competition in the market place. 10 9 4 52.6% 3.00
Medium and smaller sized EU network carriers will adopt many of the
features of the low cost business model while remaining network carriers. 20 1 2 95.2% 3.30
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Table 9: First Stage Delphi Results: Low cost carriers






More than half of intra-EU traffic will be carried by low cost carriers by
2015. 18 5 2 78.3% 3.78
There will be only 2-3 large EU low cost carriers by 2015. 19 4 2 82.61% 3.63
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Table 10: Second Stage Delphi Results: Low cost carriers






Few low cost carriers will use alliances and codesharing arrangements as
a tactical measure. 18 2 3 90.0% 3.78
At any point in time there will be more than 10 small/niche carriers
following a low cost model in the EU. 13 5 5 72.2% 3.54
Most EU low cost carriers will offer facilitated online connections. 12 9 2 57.14% 3.64
Most low cost carriers will act as feeder airlines to the long haul services
of network carriers on a contractual basis. 2 18 3 90.0% 3.72
EU measures to limit regional or airport aids/subsidies to low cost carriers
will have only a minor impact on the growth of this sector. 15 5 3 75.0% 3.20
Mason & Alamdari 47
Table 11: First Stage Delphi Results: Market behaviour






As business travellers downgrade, business class travel products will no
longer be provided on the short haul market 21 5 0 80.8% 3.62
The development of video conferencing technology will limit the growth of
air travel. 0 25 1 100.0% 3.88
The trend for multiple short-duration holidays by air will continue to growth
over the next 10 years 24 1 1 96.0% 4.25
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Table 12: Second Stage Delphi Results: Market behaviour






Business class only services, such as Lufthansa’s Dusseldorf-New York
service, will be introduced and will succeed on only a limited number of
inter-continental routes. 22 0 1 100.0% 3.82
For Europeans, long haul holiday markets will grow faster than those of
short haul. 12 8 3 60.0% 3.67
